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POLICY BRIEF

SEPTEMBER 2015

Prospects for Economic Growth
in Balochistan under Alternative
Demographic Scenarios
The Case for a Rapid Fertility Decline
Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked,
if not driven, by how rapidly fertility declines further.
Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 8
percent between 2018 and 2025. This is a very ambitious
target from the perspective of some provinces, especially
Balochistan, where physical and social infrastructure development lags behind the rest of the country. The “Proposed
Balochistan Development and Vision Strategy” of the Chief
Minister’s Policy Reform Unit aims to focus in coming years
on developing basic infrastructure and primary sectors, concentrating investments on identified “growth nodes”—selected sectors and areas that can be expected to create a pull
effect on the wider economy. Population growth is generally
not regarded as a concern in provincial economic strategy
since Balochistan has the sparsest population in the country. However, this perspective ignores the powerful impact of
demographic trends on future economic growth. Moreover, it
overlooks the urgent need for birth spacing services in the
province to reduce the extremely high maternal mortality ra-

tio, as well as infant and child deaths accruing from high-risk
fertility behavior.
Balochistan is currently undergoing a demographic transition
from a situation of high fertility and high mortality to one of
lower fertility and mortality (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in
its working-age population means the province is poised to
reap a “demographic dividend”—the boost in income per capita and its growth that accrues when the share of working age
individuals in a population rises relative to dependents, resulting in a higher support ratio,1 as well as increased labor supply and savings. As the Asian Tigers have demonstrated, a robust working-age population can serve as a potent, real world
pathway for achieving economic growth. However, harnessing
the powerful thrust of the demographic dividend requires the
timely execution of a well-conceived plan of action involving
major interventions in the education, health (including reproductive health/population welfare), and labor sectors.

F IG U RE 1 : E ME RG IN G BULG E IN B A LO C H IS TA N’ S WO RKING- AGE PO PUL ATIO N
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Encouragingly, Vision 2025 shows a strong focus on
enhancing the productive potential of the current
and future work force through investments in education, skills development, and job creation. Similarly, the need for institutional and human resource
development has recently been emphasized by the
highest levels of the Government of Balochistan.
However, there is relatively low awareness that fertility decline—and in particular the speed of that
decline—will have a huge impact on the magnitude
of the economic boost it is able to reap from the
demographic dividend.
A recent study of prospects for economic growth in
Pakistan under alternative demographic scenarios
quantified the massive differences in growth that
can be achieved with slow, moderate and rapid
fertility decline in Balochistan.2 This brief presents
the study’s key findings to facilitate a deeper understanding of the connection between the speed of
fertility decline and the size of the demographic dividend, and the scale of the economic gains at stake.

TA B L E 1: PRO J EC TED D EMO GRA PH IC S A ND EC O NO MIC GROW T H
IN B A LO C H IS TA N IN 2050 WITH S LOW, MODERAT E,
A ND RA PID F ERTIL IT Y D EC L INE
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VISION 2025

FERTILITY DECLINE AND
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC
DIVIDEND IN BALOCHISTAN
As fertility declines in Balochistan, the rate of growth in the
lowest tiers of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing
down. However, due to the momentum of past high fertility
and current improvements in infant and child survival, there
will not be an appreciable change in the rate of growth of the
working-age population for perhaps two decades. In proportion to dependents, the working-age share of the total population is rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pakistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1 (back page).
Projections of the total population were generated for three
fertility decline scenarios—moderate decline in the total fertility rate (TFR) from the current level of 4.2 to replacement
fertility (TFR 2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would
P OLI C Y B RI EF
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“The need for lowering the growth rate of
population is more urgent than ever.”
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Scenario 1
Slow Fertility
Decline

mean that replacement fertility is reached sometime after
2050; and rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement
fertility is attained before 2050. For population projections,
the base year was 1998, when the last census was conducted, while 2011 was taken as the base year for the per capita
income and demographic dividend comparison. The results
of the study for Balochistan are summarized in Table 1.
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility decline, the population of Balochistan could grow to 18 million
or to 16 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid
fertility decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately
1.5 million more young dependents in the population. This
will translate into a lower support ratio—1.62, as against 1.96
with rapid fertility decline (Table 1).
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the productive
capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which creates
the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demographic
dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic dividend,
the support ratio must be maintained at optimal levels while
the “boom” in the working-age population lasts. Fertility must
decline as much as possible to raise the support ratio, and as
fast as possible to allow the high support ratio to prevail over
a longer period. Figure 3 presents the historical and prospective trend in Balochistan’s support ratio and how it is affected by the pace of fertility decline. Notably, the support ratio
started to rise in the late 1990s—when energetic efforts were
made to increase uptake of family planning—but it is now beginning to plateau. It can be expected to rise significantly if a
moderate or rapid pace of fertility decline is achieved.

Population (millions)

F IGURE 2: PROJE C TE D PO PU L ATIO N G ROW TH IN
B A LOC H I S TAN W ITH SLOW, M O D E RATE,
A ND R A PID F E RTIL IT Y D E C L IN E
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Support Ratio

F IGURE 3: H I S T OR I CAL TRE N D S A N D P RO J E C TED
GROW T H IN BA LO C H IS TA N ’ S SUPPO RT
R AT IO W ITH S LOW, MO D E RATE , AN D
R A PI D FERTIL IT Y D E C L IN E

Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide divergences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4).
In 2050, per capita income in Balochistan is expected to be
about $2,500 if fertility persists at current levels; a little over
$3,600, if fertility declines slowly; and about $4,500, if fertility drops rapidly.
This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the
current vicinity of 4.2, Balochistan’s GDP per capita will only
be about 165 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; however, if the TFR declines rapidly, Balochistan’s GDP per capita
could grow by as much as 388 percent. In other words, a precipitous decline in fertility could boost income in Balochistan
by 223 percent over current levels, independent of any additional income growth that occurs over this horizon. By comparison, a slow decline in fertility would lead to a 130 percent
boost in income, which, significant as it is, represents only
about half of the dividend achievable.
The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to increase by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for investing in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.

“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025

Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

F IGURE 4: PROJE C TE D PE R CA PITA L G D P G ROW TH
IN B A LOC H IS TA N W ITH SLOW, M O D ERATE,
A ND R A PID F E RTIL IT Y D E C L IN E
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By 2050, Balochistan’s per capita income will be 165 percent higher than today’s levels if there is no decline in fertility, but 388 percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The
scale and effectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in
Balochistan will determine whether per capita income in the
province grows by 295 percent or by 388 percent by 2050.
The possible demographic dividend of a 223 percent increase in per capita income is simply too huge to be ignored
in economic growth strategy, especially given Balochistan’s
resource constraints and development aspirations. The findings presented in this brief show clearly that, if Balochistan is
to harness the demographic dividend, planners must invest
at least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to educate,
train and productively employ the youth bulge.

S EP T EMB ER 2 015
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Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limited-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels,
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance
of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By around
2050, the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will
have progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while a
reduced population of young people will have entered Balochistan’s work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline
and the dividend window will close.

END NOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E.
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.

“The speed at which fertility declines now in
Balochistan will determine the magnitude of
the economic boost it will experience.”

BOX 1: M OD E L U S E D TO P RO J E C T PRO SPE C T S FO R EC O NO MIC GROW TH UND ER A LTERNATIVE
D E M OGR A PH IC SC E N A RIO S
GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.

α

yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + ηT Xt + €t

Where yt = log(Yt ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(Yt ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demoPt
Lt
graphic variables.
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1.

Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.

2.

Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per
woman) assumption throughout.

3.

Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births
per woman) assumption throughout.

An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
i
0
IDDi = y 2050 – y 2050.

y2011

Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y02050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015).
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